Terrorism And Lethality Term paper
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Although the total volume of terrorist incidents world-wide has declined in the
1990s, the proportion of persons killed in terrorist incidents has steadily
risen. For example, according to the RAND-St Andrews University Chronology of
International Terrorism,5 a record 484 international terrorist incidents were
recorded in 1991, the year of the Gulf War, followed by 343 incidents in 1992,
360 in 1993, 353 in 1994, falling to 278 incidents in 1995 (the last calendar
year for which complete statistics are available).6 However, while terrorists
were becoming less active, they were nonetheless becoming more lethal. For
example, at least one person was killed in 29 percent of terrorist incidents in
1995: the highest percentage of fatalities to incidents recorded in the
Chronology since 1968--and an increase of two percent over the previous year's
record figure.7 In the United States this trend was most clearly reflected in
1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Since
the turn of the century, fewer than a dozen of all the terrorist incidents
committed world-wide have killed more than a 100 people. The 168 persons
confirmed dead at the Murrah Building ranks sixth on the list of most fatalities
caused this centuryin a single terrorist incident--domestic or international.8
The reasons for terrorism's increasing lethality are complex and variegated, but
can generally be summed up as follows: The growth in the number of terrorist
groups motivated by a religious imperative; The proliferation of
"amateurs" involved in terrorist acts; and, The increasing
sophistication and operational competence of "professional"
terrorists. Religious Terrorism The increase of terrorism motivated by a
religious imperative neatly encapsulates the confluence of new adversaries,
motivations and rationales affecting terrorist patterns today. Admittedly, the
connection between religion and terrorism is not new.9 However, while religion
and terrorism do share a long history, in recent decades this form particular
variant has largely been overshadowed by ethnic- and nationalist-separatist or
ideologically-motivated terrorism. Indeed, none of the 11 identifiable terrorist
groups10 active in 1968 (the year credited with marking the advent of modern,
international terrorism) could be classified as "religious."11 Not
until 1980 in fact--as a result of the repercussions from the revolution in Iran
the year before--do the first "modern" religious terrorist groups
appear:12 but they amount to only two of the 64 groups active that year. Twelve
years later, however, the number of religious terrorist groups has increased
nearly six-fold, representing a quarter (11 of 48) of the terrorist
organisations who carried out attacks in 1992. Significantly, this trend has not
only continued, but has actually accelerated. By 1994, a third (16) of the 49
identifiable terrorist groups could be classified as religious in character
and/or motivation. Last year their number increased yet again, no to account for
nearly half (26 or 46 percent) of the 56 known terrorist groups active in 1995.
The implications of terrorism motivated by a religious imperative for higher
levels of lethality is evidenced by the violent record of various Shi'a Islamic
groups during the 1980s. For example, although these organisations committed
only eight percent of all recorded international terrorist incidents between
1982 and 1989, they were nonetheless responsible for nearly 30 percent of the
total number of deaths during that time period.13 Indeed, some of the most
significant terrorist acts of the past 18 months, for example, have all had some
religious element present.14 Even more disturbing is that in some instances the
perpetrators' aims have gone beyond the establishment of some theocracy amenable
to their specific deity,15 but have embraced mystical, almost transcendental,
and divinely-inspired imperatives16 or a vehemently anti-government form of
"populism" reflecting far-fetched conspiracy notions based on a
volatile mixture of seditious, racial and religious dicta.17 Religious
terrorism18 tends to be more lethal than secular terrorism because of the
radically different value systems, mechanisms of legitimisation and
justification, concepts of morality, and Manichean world views that directly
affect the "holy terrorists'" motivation. For the religious terrorist,
violence first and foremost is a sacramental act or divine duty: executed in
direct response to some theological demand or imperative and justified by
scripture. Religion, therefore functions as a legitimising force: specifically
sanctioning wide scale violence against an almost open-ended category of
opponents (e.g., all peoples who are not members of the religious terrorists'
religion or cult). This explains why clerical sanction is so important for
religious terrorists19 and why religious figures are often required to
"bless" (e.g., approve) terrorist operations before they are executed.
"Amateur" Terrorists The proliferation of "amateurs"
involved in terrorist acts has also contributed to terrorism's increasing
lethality. In the past, terrorism was not just a matter of having the will and
motivation to act, but of having the capability to do so--the requisite
training, access to weaponry, and operational knowledge. These were not readily
available capabilities and were generally acquired through training undertaken
in camps known to be run either by other terrorist organisations and/or in
concert with the terrorists' state-sponsors.20 Today, however, the means and
methods of terrorism can be easily obtained at bookstores, from mail-order
publishers, on CD-ROM or even over the Internet. Hence, terrorism has become
accessible to anyone with a grievance, an agenda, a purpose or any idiosyncratic
combination of the above. Relying on these commercially obtainable published
bomb-making manuals and operational guidebooks, the "amateur"
terrorist can be just as deadly and destructive21--and even more difficult to
track and anticipate--than his "professional" counterpart.22 In this
respect, the alleged "Unabomber," Thomas Kaczynski is a case in point.
From a remote cabin in the Montana hinterland, Kaczynski is believed to have
fashioned simple, yet sophisticated home-made bombs from ordinary materials that
were dispatched to his victims via the post. Despite one of the most massive
manhunts staged by the FBI in the United States, the "Unabomber" was
nonetheless able to elude capture--much less identification--for 18 years and
indeed to kill three persons and injure 23 others. Hence, the
"Unabomber" is an example of the difficulties confronting law
enforcement and other government authorities in first identifying, much less,
apprehending the "amateur" terrorist and the minimal skills needed to
wage an effective terrorist campaign. This case also evidences the
disproportionately extensive consequences even violence committed by a lone
individual can have both on society (in terms of the fear and panic sown) and on
law enforcement (because of the vast resources that are devoted to the
identification and apprehension of this individual). "Amateur"
terrorists are dangerous in other ways as well. In fact, the absence of some
central command authority may result in fewer constraints on the terrorists'
operations and targets and--especially when combined with a religious fervour--fewer
inhibitions on their desire to inflict indiscriminate casualties. Israeli
authorities, for example, have noted this pattern among terrorists belonging to
the radical Palestinian Islamic Hamas organisation in contrast to their
predecessors in the ostensibly more secular and professional,
centrally-controlled mainstream Palestine Liberation Organization terrorist
groups. As one senior Israeli security official noted of a particularly vicious
band of Hamas terrorists: they "were a surprisingly unprofessional bunch .
. . they had no preliminary training and acted without specific
instructions."23 In the United States, to cite another example of the
potentially destructively lethal power of amateur terrorists, it is suspected
that the 1993 World Trade Center bombers' intent was in fact to bring down one
of the twin towers.24 By contrast, there is no evidence that the persons we once
considered to be the world's arch-terrorists--the Carloses, Abu Nidals, and Abul
Abbases--ever contemplated, much less attempted, to destroy a high-rise office
building packed with people. Indeed, much as the inept World Trade Center
bombers were derided for their inability to avoid arrest, their modus operandi
arguably points to a pattern of future terrorist activities elsewhere. For
example, as previously noted, terrorist groups were once recognisable as
distinct organisational entities. The four convicted World Trade Center bombers
shattered this stereotype. Instead they comprised a more or less ad hoc
amalgamation of like-minded individuals who shared a common religion, worshipped
at the same religious institution, had the same friends and frustrations and
were linked by family ties as well, who simply gravitated towards one another
for a specific, perhaps even one-time, operation.25 Moreover, since this more
amorphous and perhaps even transitory type of group will lack the
"footprints" or modus operandi of an actual, existing terrorist
organization, it is likely to prove more difficult for law enforcement to get a
firm idea or build a complete picture of the dimensions of their intentions and
capabilities. Indeed, as one New York City police officer only too presciently
observed two months before the Trade Center attack: it wasn't the established
terrorist groups--with known or suspected members and established operational
patterns--that worried him, but the hitherto unknown "splinter
groups," composed of new or marginal members from an older group, that
suddenly surface out of nowhere to attack.26 Essentially, part-time time
terrorists, such loose groups of individuals, may be--as the World Trade Center
bombers themselves appear to have been--indirectly influenced or remotely
controlled by some foreign government or non-governmental entity. The suspicious
transfer of funds from banks in Iran and Germany to a joint account maintained
by the accused bombers in New Jersey just before the Trade Center blast, for
example, may be illustrative of this more indirect or circuitous foreign
connection.27 Moreover, the fact that two Iraqi nationals--Ramzi Ahmed Yousef
(who was arrested last April in Pakistan and extradited to the United States)
and Abdul Rahman Yasin--implicated in the Trade Center conspiracy, fled the
United States28 in one instance just before the bombing and in the other shortly
after the first arrests, increases suspicion that the incident may not only have
been orchestrated from abroad but may in fact have been an act of
state-sponsored terrorism. Thus, in contrast to the Trade Center bombing's
depiction in the press as a terrorist incident perpetrated by a group of
"amateurs" acting either entirely on their own or, as one of the
bomber's defence attorneys portrayed his client manipulated by a "devious,
evil . . . genius"29 (Yousef), the original genesis of the Trade Center
attack may be far more complex. This use of amateur terrorists as
"dupes" or "cut-outs" to mask the involvement of some
foreign patron or government could therefore greatly benefit terrorist state
sponsors who could more effectively conceal their involvement and thus avoid
potential military retaliation by the victim country and diplomatic or economic
sanctions from the international community. Moreover, the prospective
state-sponsors' connection could be further obscured by the fact that much of
the "amateur" terrorists' equipment, resources and even funding could
be entirely self-generating. For example, the explosive device used at the World
Trade Center was constructed out of ordinary, commercially-available
materials--including lawn fertiliser (urea nitrate) and diesel fuel--and cost
less than $400 to build.30 Indeed, despite the Trade Center bombers' almost
comical ineptitude in avoiding capture, they were still able to shake an entire
city's--if not country's--complacency. Further, the "simple" bomb used
by these "amateurs" proved just as deadly and destructive--killing six
persons, injuring...
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