Progressive Historians Essay
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One must decide the meaning of “progressive historiography.” It can mean
either the history written by “progressive historians,” or it can mean
history written by historians of the Progressive era of American history and
shortly after. The focus that was chosen for this paper is more in keeping with
the latter interpretation, if for no other reason than it provides a useful
compare-and-contrast “control” literature. The caveat is this: the focus of
this report is on the predominant question of the historiographical period: was
the war a revolution or a war for independence? One could choose many other
questions to argue, questions that historians have for years disputed about the
revolution, but there are a number of reasons why this report was chosen for
this particular assignment; the two best follow. First, it is an old and
time-honored question that professors and instructors have posed to their
students for years; of pre-Civil War historiographical questions, it is perhaps
second only in fashion during the last twenty to twenty-five years to the
Jefferson-Hemmings paternity controversy. Second, the revolution-or-independence
question is one of those which must be answered through interpretation. A case
cannot be made that is so utterly conclusive as to exclude all others; it is
that very fact that makes history at once so frustrating and so fascinating.
What better way could there be to look at the writings of a specific school of
historians? Therefore, in the pursuit of “personal truth,” we must
proceed... Perhaps the most famous of all progressive historians is Frederick
Jackson Turner. His most famous argument is not devoted strictly to the American
Revolution, but instead to the effects of the American frontier. In a sentence,
his argument is that the frontier was the chief determinant in American history.
This is not to say that Turner did not write about the war; he did, in his
seminal work, “The Frontier in American History,” there are discussions of
the frontier’s effect on the coming of the revolution. It is worth noting,
before exploring Turner’s arguments, that the frontier in this period was only
about one hundred miles from the Atlantic coast. Of course, as the period under
scrutiny approaches the war chronologically, the frontier moves away from the
ocean. But it is important to remember that Turner defines the Jamestown of
Captain John Smith in 1607 as the frontier in its initial stage. So, in this
context, it makes sense to the almost-twenty-first-century reader when Turner
refers to the frontier as defined by the Proclamation of 1763 as the “Old
West.” Turner gives an idea of his world-view near the end of the book: The
transformations through which the United States is passing in our own day are so
profound, so far-reaching, that it is hardly an exaggeration to say that we are
witnessing the birth of a new nation in America. The revolution in social and
economic structure of this country during the past two decades is comparable to
what occurred when independence was declared and the constitution was formed, or
to the changes wrought by the era which began half a century ago, the era of
Civil War and Reconstruction (Turner 1920, 311). This point bears further
examination in the context of all the historians being compared in this paper,
but in a later section. It is more important at this point to continue with the
discussion of Turner’s examination of the war as it relates to his frontier
thesis. Briefly, Turner argues five points specific to the war in his overall
treatment of the frontier. First, a fighting frontier had been established from
Georgia to New England as a result of the colonial wars with the French. Second,
a primitively agricultural and democratically self-sufficient society had been
established on the frontier that was profoundly and fundamentally different from
the society from which the frontiersmen’s progenitors had sprung; it is of
course because those progenitors were different from their fellows that they
came across the ocean in the first place. Third, the frontier developed home
markets for the growing—--though still small—--colonial industrial base,
lessening the importance of the triangular trade. Fourth, non-English settlers
had caused an unintended and at first informal breach with the mother country
that later fueled separatist sentiment; it is no great thing in the thick of
rebellion to forget that the war was at first a war for the rights of Englishmen
when one is not an Englishman in the first place. Fifth, the frontier by its
very nature reflected a contest between the privileged and the non-privileged;
Turner maintains that this dichotomy was more in evidence outside New England
and was more of a democratic revolution outside that region than inside (Turner
1920, 106-111). Of course, one is tempted to minimize, or even belittle this
last observation by pointing out that the New Englanders provided the bulk of
the troops for the rebel army... In any case, Turner’s arguments foreshadow
those of another historian, J. Franklin Jameson. Both argue a geographical or
quasi-geographical determinism. Both argue that the war was a revolution that
resulted in greater democracy, though their definitions of democracy are rather
broad. Before turning to Jameson, however, another work by Turner should be
mentioned, entitled “The Significance of Sections in American History,”
which was published in 1932, at the height of the Great Depression. This book is
not exclusively about the American Revolution. Instead, it discusses several
important factors in American history from a demographic perspective. Turner
echoes his own frontier thesis in this work, citing instances in the West that
shaped the character of the Revolution. The behavior of the earliest pioneers
was important in understanding the later evolution of the country, he argued,
and focused on the North Carolina frontiersmen. He concluded that the
Association desired “not to be arded as a lawless mob,” and their petition
for annexation to North Carolina led to a regularization of the political status
of the frontier districts (Turner 1932, 97). This pattern would be repeated
again and again in the decades after the war, but Turner’s point is that the
frontier districts were just as important to the political and social nature of
the struggle as were the established eastern districts and towns which have
received so much more “press” in the literature. Another factor of
consequence in Turner’s view was early sectionalism (indeed, that is the focus
of this particular book, much more so than the American war for independence).
“The West,” which in the middle nineteenth century meant such lands as Iowa
and Indiana, instead meant in pre-Revolutionary years the western regions of the
existing colonies. Turner specifically discussed the western regions of
Maryland, Virginia, and the Carolinas. He suggested that the geography of the
region--rocky and mountainous, in distinct contrast to the alluvial plains of
the tidewater region--made for an order much more like New England society than
the planter-led society of Virginia and the rest of the South. He contended that
the frontier communities were more democratic. An informed reader can today
easily infer that Turner was writing not just of the revolution, but of the
beginnings of the sectional competition that culminated in the American Civil
War (Turner 1932, 293). But it is the geographical determinism that Turner
advances that is of the most interest to this paper; one sees the same sort of
argument again and again while reading the works of Turner and his fellows in
the progressive school. J. Franklin Jameson wrote a landmark work in 1926. More
accurately, it was a collection of four lectures that were subsequently
collected into a hundred-page book. His basic premise was that the war was a
social revolution. He made four main arguments (coincidental with the four
lectures), which follow. First, Jameson argued that the status of persons was
changed. He maintained that slavery was ended in a significant region by the
war, and that abolitionism became fashionable and real as a political force. In
order to contest this conclusion, it is a simple thing to counter-argue that
since Massachusetts had but five slaves in 1776, it seems that slavery was
definitely on its way out before the war even began in earnest. Moreover, it
would be obvious to point out that abolitionism was certainly not new to the
Northern States before and during the war. In short, the arguments regarding the
status of people and how that status changed as a result of the war really do
not hold up under scrutiny. Second, Jameson argued that the nature of the land
promoted change in the people. He claimed that the geography of New England made
for revolutionary thought among small holders and freemen that was not so
evident among those in the tidewater south. But the colonists were “different
sorts” to begin with; the Pilgrims and Puritans of the North were outcasts
before they came across the Atlantic. The middle-staters of Pennsylvania--the
Quakers--and especially Maryland--Catholics, Huguenots, and Presbyterians--were
already in search of a place where they could be different and be at least
quasi-independent. To lay the responsibility for the revolution on mountains and
streams, thereby ignoring the nature of the people before they arrived, is a bit
much to swallow. Did the land change the colonists, or were the human changes to
the land merely a reflection of the ideas the colonists had with them already,
and of the institutional-cultural heritage of these people? At the very least,
it is a chicken-and-egg question, but it seems that the latter argument is the
accurate one. In this same vein, Jameson cites the end of primogeniture as a
social-revolutionary aspect of the war. To illustrate the inaccuracy of this
interpretation, one need only mention that primogeniture was abolished in
Britain over time without a war at all. It seems that the trend away from
primogeniture was already afoot in the British world (of which the colonists
were a part, and of which even in 1776 most wished to remain). War or no war,
primogeniture would almost certainly have receded, as it did. In addition,
Jameson claims that the frontier unleashed a revolution. His view is that the
frontier itself was in some way responsible for revolutionary attitudes and
thoughts, as if the land itself changed the way that the residents thought. For
the sake of brevity, let us say only that Turner’s frontier thesis is a much
more convincing picture of American history than is Jameson’s. In short,
Turner argues that the frontier throughout American history has attracted and
promoted certain types of people and certain types of behavior. Jameson implies
that the frontier made revolutionaries, and that when the war was over, they
stopped being revolutionary. Turner makes the point from the opposite pole: the
frontier, by its very nature, provided an environment where people who would
otherwise have been misfits and malcontents could flourish and achieve a modicum
of what would then certainly have been termed “respectability.” Jameson’s
argument virtually anthropomorphizes the frontier, while Turner casts the region
in a more proper role: that of a passive agent. Third, Jameson discusses
business and industry. He discusses how the war caused the Agricultural
Revolution to be visited upon the Americas. In Europe, where land was at a
premium, peasants had had to adopt new methods in order to survive their growing
population. By contrast, in the colonies, land was cheap and plentiful, so new
methods were not required. Nonetheless, it seems safe to argue that the methods
adopted in the colonies would have been adopted eventually, war or no war, when
the population density made it sensible to do so. Along similar lines, Jameson
suggests that the war caused a revolutionary growth and change in war and
commercial industries: paper, salt, powder, cannons, and muskets all had to be
manufactured to fight the war. Of course, after 1918, when the industrial nature
of warfare had become painfully evident. It is easy to see how he made this
conclusion. But it is also easy to see, even with the benefit of the same
hindsight that Jameson could have used, that the growth of industry and commerce
would almost certainly have occurred anyway, war or no war. Napoleonic France
was not converted into an industrial power, despite nearly twenty-five years of
virtually non-stop warfare that was of a far greater magnitude than was the
“American Revolution.” It is far more sensible to argue that the industry
and commerce of the Americas would have developed as a result of trade with
Europe, with or without a war. Lastly, many participants argued at the time that
the colonies were economically weakened because of the war for a significant
period. How is it that Jameson concluded the exact opposite one hundred fifty
years later? Fourth, Jameson argued that thought and feeling changed. At first,
this claim seems the most plausible. He suggested that the war was a precursor
to the European revolutionary fervor of the 1830s; this perhaps has some
validity, but the fervor of the 1830s was a more
peasants-against-the-aristocracy sort of thing than it was a
taxation-without-representation sort of thing. Another difference was
nationalism, a decidedly made-in-France phenomenon. Greeks, for example, rose up
against the Ottoman Turks in 1830 in order to establish a Greek state. This was
not the nature of the American war, for no foreign power of different ethnicity
held sway in the colonies; certainly no Germans rose up in Pennsylvania in order
to establish a German-style state out of the old British colony. Indeed, Germans
tended toward loyalist sensibilities. Jameson argued that the war had the effect
of creating more colleges and of diffusing religious faith. This certainly is a
description of cultural contact with Europe more than it is a description of a
result of a war. These very things took place in Europe before and after the
American war; sometimes these phenomena were accompanied by violence and armed
struggle, and sometimes not. The Americas were already religiously diverse, and
it probably comes as no surprise that the conclusion to this paper is that the
growth of colleges was accompanied by, and was a result of, a substantial growth
in the population. This rather leaves the war out of the picture; for wars
seldom create things, but instead tend to destroy or impede them. It should be
pointed out that Jameson makes no political arguments outside of suffrage. (One
generally thinks of dramatic political changes as being a result of a
“revolution.”) He discusses political institutions not at all. He is only
concerned with who had the vote. However, even before the war, the colonies had
wider suffrage than the European countries from which the people and their
forebears came; how is this a revolutionary outcome? Were these people not
fighting to preserve that which they already had against the growing influence
of the House of Commons, which threatened to take their self-determination away?
Slavery was already receding in the colonies; it was evolving away--in Vermont
in 1777, Pennsylvania in 1780, Rhode Island and Connecticut in 1784; if the
revolution was the cause, why then did abolition, albeit gradual, continue its
march in New York in 1799 and New Jersey in 1804? The American variety of
slavery was already “less bad” than in many, if not most, other countries,
regardless of what twentieth-century movie and television productions might have
you believe. Was the country not already progressive? Another writer of note who
is labeled as a progressive historian is Carl Becker. He was a student of
Frederick Jackson Turner and submitted as his doctoral dissertation--it was
called a thesis at that time--a work entitled “The History of Political
Parties in the Province of New York.” In it, Becker writes that the political
parties in what became the state of New York were embroiled in a tremendous
rivalry. The members of the “conservative” wing wanted only to go so far as
to assert their rights as Englishmen, while the radical element desired
independence. Becker argues for a compromise interpretation in his conclusion,
stating that “although the conservatives were successful in securing a
government measurably centralized and measurably aristocratic, we know that
there was considerable pressure for a more democratic form” (Becker 1909,
276). In short, Becker describes the desire for a significantly different form
of government than that which England had, and existed in the colony before the
insurrection. In the end, of course, the form was essentially the same; that is,
a bicameral legislature was placed in the stead of Parliament, the President
(who likely could have been King George I of America) was substituted for the
King of England, and a judicial branch was established to play the role of the
British courts. It is significant to mention that the second provincial congress
of New York opposed independence from Great Britain at least as late as May 14,
1775 (Becker 1909, 252). It is the extent of suffrage that gives a measure of
truth to the progressive argument as symbolized by Becker’s work. The growth
of political groups in New York presaged the formation of formal parties in the
colonies as a whole, foreshadowed the further entrenchment of those same parties
after the Constitution was ratified, and paralleled the same developmental path
in Great Britain. The same congress mentioned above voted to extend the
franchise to freeholders and freemen with holdings equivalent to forty pounds
(Becker 1909, 252). The Committee of fifty-one was essentially dissolved as the
Mechanics and the fifty-one merged in a new system that eliminated wards and
substituted in its place a system of election by citizens at large (Becker 1909,
166). This presaged a similar reform in England after the war with Napoleon, the
Reform Bill of 1832. One is tempted to wonder if that reform in England was
delayed by the war; certainly one could argue that the reform in New York was
prompted by the war, but one can also be left with a sense that the change was
on the verge of taking place anyway, war or no war. Nonetheless, Becker is
consistent with other progressive historians when he argues the case of extended
suffrage as a result of the conflict with Great Britain. Becker is also in step
with his progressive counterparts when he argues his “road to revolution”
thesis from the point of view of merchants. He spends an entire chapter
discussing in detail the relative efficacy of the non-importation measures
instituted by the colonies (the word “boycott” had of course not yet been
coined in the 1770s, and historians of the early 1900s were apparently
disinclined to use it). In short, he argues that the non-intercourse measures (a
synonym for non-importation) were essentially ineffective. To be sure, there
were fluctuations, but the image of the non-importation measures must be one of
reducing the flow of goods, not one of shutting the flow off and turning it on
when the colonists...
Beard, Charles A. An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of theUnited States. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1913. Beard, Charles A. and Mary.
Basic History of the United States. New York: Doubleday, Doran, and Company,
1944. Becker, Carl. Beginnings of the American People. New York: Houghton
Mifflin, 1922. Becker, Carl. The History of Political Parties in the Province of
New York, 1760-1776. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin, 1909. Billias,
George Athan, ed. The American Revolution: How Revolutionary Was It? New York:
Holt Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1990. Originally published in 1965. Used for
background reading only. Fiske, John. The American Revolution, vol. II. New
York: Houghton Mifflin, 1891. Hart, Albert Bushnell. Formation of the Union,
1750-1829. New York: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1894. Hofstadter, Richard.
The Progressive Historians: Turner, Beard, Parrington. New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1968. Jameson, J. Franklin. The American Revolution Considered as a
Social Movement. Princeton University: Princeton University Press, 1973.
Originally published in 1926. Schlesinger, Arthur M. Sr. The Colonial Merchants
and the American Revolution. New York: Facsimile Library, Inc., 1939. Originally
published in 1918. Turner, Frederick Jackson. The Frontier in American History.
New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1962. Originally published in 1920.
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