Term paper on Dieppe The Valour And The Horror

Dieppe The Valour And The Horror Essays

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When examined closely, the Dieppe raid can be seen for what it truly was- a politically

motivated disaster which, due to poor planning and over zealous British leadership,

sacrificed needlessly the lives of Canadians for no practical reason at all. In reality, the

Canadians who died at Dieppe had no real chance at victory and the British high command

knew it, but preferred to martyr the men, rather than look bad in the eyes of their Russian

and American allies. As such, Dieppe should not be seen as a dress rehearsal for D-Day,

but rather as a tragic comedy of errors which led to the annihilation of over 900 Canadian

soldiers.

The raid itself was primarily a British venture. In 1942 things were still going

poorly for the allies. The British were retreating in Africa and Burma, and the Americans

were trying to stop the advance of the Japanese in the Pacific. At this time, the Germans

were also pushing the Russians back to Moscow and Stalingrad (Steubing, 2). As such,

the high commands of the Russians and Americans believed that something needed to be

done, and soon. Molotov, the Russian foreign minister had visited Britain before the

original planning for the Dieppe raid, and had suggested that if a second front were not

opened, Russia may be forced to surrender. This would have been a disaster for the

British, as it would have freed up the entire German, Romanian, Italian, Bulgarian, and

Hungarian armies to fight in Africa and even the Middle East and India, and would have

allowed the Germans to put more attention into an invasion of Britain (Steubing, 3).

There was also pressure from the Americans to make the raid. The Americans had

originally planned for a second front to be created by the British, which would then be

supported by newly created American divisions. The British knew that with their army

fighting in Africa and Burma they had nowhere near the strength to create a new front, but

wanted to satisfy their new ally, so they agreed to the raid (Whitaker, 33).

The last British factor for launching the raid was Lord Louis Mountbatten, who

created the original plans. His ambition in the raid was to create a name for himself, and

earn the respect of the high command (Steubing, 33).

The reasons for the Canadians wanting to participate in the raid were not as

complex. The three major reasons the Canadians were eager to go along with any plan

were: The bulk of the Canadian army had been in Britain since the beginning of the war

without having seen action and were getting restless; Canadian leaders wanted the

Canadians to see action before the Americans did, and Canadian General Roberts wanted

to earn the respect of his British superiors (Canada: The War Years 1939-1945, 1). In the

end, the final two factors would ensure that, even as the plan deteriorated before them, the

Canadians would remain in favour of the attack, even if it meant total destruction.

When the events leading up to the raid, and the deterioration of the plan are

reviewed, it becomes quite evident that the plan should never have been allowed to go

ahead. The original battle plan contained 6 safeguards to ensure success. These were that

Heavy bombers would devastate the town and demoralize the defenders; there would be

support fire from Naval guns, especially on the main beach; tanks would shepherd in the

assault troops on the main beach; British commandos would have taken out the heavy

coastal gun positions before the landings occurred; the assault would take the Germans by

surprise, and that the German defenses at Dieppe were weak.

On June 5th, the aerial bombing which was to take place was scrapped for mainly

political reasons. Churchill did not want to bomb any French towns out of fear of losing

French support, but the official reason was that the bombings would have been too weak

to have any effect, which is simply not true (Whitaker, 40). The 150 planned sorties

would have done incredible damage to the coastal defenses, as well as forced the German

defenders to take cover, making them unable to man their defenses (Botting, 23).

Shortly afterwards the naval support for the main beach was cancelled, as High

command believed that it would put the battleships and destroyers in danger (Whitaker,

45). The 8 Hunt class destroyers left to provide support were weak at best, and had

official orders that they “may” have to provide naval support (Whitaker, 45). Most

members of the Royal navy were surprised that the canceling of the bombings did not

increase the Naval support. According to Admiral Baillie-Grohman, “The decision to

cancel the bombing did not lead to a demand to increase correspondingly the naval

support gunfire.”

The main problem with the canceling of the bombings and the lack of naval

support was that without them, German defenses would be allowed to remain intact and

ready for the attack (Whitaker, 50). The canceling of the bombings also made surprise

absolutely vital to the plan. Despite the dire need for surprise, high command knew that

none could be achieved. A combined Operation internal memo read, “...we must expect

all points on the [French] coast to be alert, particularly after dawn. Tactical surprise will

be most difficult to achieve” (Whitaker, 155).

The British high command realized that because of the good landing and weather

conditions the German defenses would be put on high alert, just as theirs had been when

the threat of a German invasion had been at its highest. The Canadians about to attack

Dieppe, such as Lieutenant J.S. Edmondson of the South Saskatchewan regiment, also

realized that surprise would be hard to achieve. “When the tide was right and the

moonlight was right, we doubled the sentries, we doubled the alert, we doubled

everything. The Germans are just as smart as we are. If the tide is right and the moon is

right and everything is right for us to go, they’re going to double theirs. Now how do you

think we can gain surprise?” (Whitaker, 161).

John Campbell also identified the slim chance of surprise being achieved at Dieppe.

“If the good soldier Haase (Commander of the German forces at Dieppe), guarding a

sensitive stretch of the channel not long after the commando raid on St. Nazaire wasn’t

thinking in terms of an imminent British landing then he surely should have been”

(Whitaker, 155).

The plan itself practically guaranteed that the forces on the main beach would not

have any chance of achieving surprise as well. The plan called for the flanks to attack first

and knock out the German artillery and coastal guns. However, by having the flanks

attack first, the Germans defending the main beach would have had lots of time to prepare

for the attack, and since there was no bombardment or naval support previous to the

landing, the Germans on the main beach had all the time in the world to dig in and prepare

(Whitaker, 140). Not all of the British leaders were blind to this fact however, including

Admiral Roskill of the Royal Navy. “Even if the flank attacks catch the enemy

unprepared, the town’s defenders were bound to be fully alerted before the main assault

was launched” (Whitaker, 140).

While the British were remaining oblivious to the fact that surprise could never be

achieved, military observers from other countries,including American commander,

lieutenant Colonel Charles Shreiner Jr. had identified the problems. “Why, after the

bombing was cancelled, was the timing of the landings never changed to ensure surprise

for the main assault? It was scheduled to take place 30 minutes after the initial commando

attack- plenty of time for the Germans to come to full alert” (Whitaker, 141).

To make matters worse in respect to surprise, German commander Haase had put

his troops on a special state of readiness during the period between June 25th and July 10

(Whitaker, 150). All evidence seemed to point to the fact that Haase was ready for an

attack. Admiral Roskill added more compelling evidence to support this claim when he

said, “On the 25th/26th of June the artillery in the Dieppe area remained limbered up all

night... The Germans had put 2 and 2 together” (Whitaker, 155).

As a result of all these problems, surprise was simply not possible, and while high

command was well aware of it, they chose to push on anyway.

The next safeguard to fall was the hopes that the German defenses at Dieppe were

weak. In reality, the defenses at Dieppe were 4 times stronger than High command

believed (Disaster at Dieppe, 1). To make matters worse, High Command was aware of

the presence of newly arrived reinforcements and a panzer division from Russia only 40

Km’s outside of Dieppe (Whitaker, 161). All this meant that the Canadians were going to

attack a force of similar size, backed by artillery and well dug in. This meant certain

disaster, but High Command still pushed on.

The last safeguard, the knowledge that the troops on the main beach would have

tank support, was not as secure as High Command believed. Due to a lack of planning,

high command didn’t realize that the beach at Dieppe consisted of a unique pebble sand

known as “chert”. Chert was created by particles of lime which had worn off of the

overhanging cliffs on the beach, and was unstable at best. With conditions such as these,

the tanks were almost guaranteed to sink into the sand (Whitaker, 151). High Command

had based the beaches compatibility to handle tanks on postcards and rough photographs,

and beach conditions found on the Isle of Wight in the English Channel (Whitaker, 152).

In fact, the only available means to...

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